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K Y B E R N E T I K A — V O L U M E 16 (1980), N U M B E R 1 
Parameter Optimization in Nonzero-Sum 
Diíferential Games 
JAROSLAV D O L E Ž A L 
It is assumed that in addition to the classical formulation of many-player nonzero-sum dif-
ferential game one of the players, say the first, can choose the values of certain parameters to 
further decrease his pay-off functional with respect to its equilibrium (Nash) value. Such action 
causes clearly also changes in pay-off functionals of the remaining players. In contrast to the 
two-player zero-sum case these changes are generally both positive and negative depending on 
a particular pay-off functional. To solve this problem in the best possible way for the first player, 
a set of necessary optimality conditions is presented, which not only determine the Nash equi-
librium strategies for all participating players, but also the optimal parameters. Based on these 
conditions an iterative numerical algorithm of gradient type is suggested. Several illustrative 
examples are included which were solved applying this algorithm. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
To begin let us summarize some facts concerning the area of parameter optimiza-
tion. First of all, as it is known from control theory, the optimal behaviour of any 
dynamical system is usually a function of various system parameters. These para-
meters can be sometimes used to further improve the performance of the system in 
question. In optimal control theory such a class of problems is denoted as parameter 
optimization or optimal parameter estimation or optimal setting of constants. 
Here we shall show that this procedure is applicable to the case of many-players 
nonzero-sum differential games. The further described results can be thus regarded 
as the extensions of existing results in optimal control theory and two-player zero-sum 
differential games. 
At the present time there exist several papers which contain fairly deep results 
dealing with parameter optimization for control systems. The fundamental results 
in this field are due Hofer and Sagirow [1] and Boltjanskij [2] Later Ahmed and 
Georganas [3] showed that the results of Boltjanskij [2] follow from the general 
maximum principle of Gamkrelidze [4]. Recently Georganas [5] presented imbed- 55 
ding techniques for optimal parameter estimation, provided that the the optimal 
parameter could be expressed analytically. Also Lunderstadt [6] described necessary 
optimality conditions for parameter optimization using the maximum principle 
approach. 
Dolezal and Cerny [7] used the calculus of variations to obtain the necessary 
optimality conditions and proposed a first-order gradient algorithm based on the 
so-called influence functions for the iterative solution of parameter optimization 
problems. For optimal control problems this algorithm was described by Bryson and 
Ho [8]. Moreover, the gradient algorithm of Dolezal and Cerny [7] enables also 
treatment of control and parameter constrained problems using the projection tech-
nique, e.g., see Vasiljev [9]. An alternative gradient-restoration approach can be 
found in a survey paper of Miele [10]. 
The results of Dolezal and Cerny [7] were extended recently by the author [11, 12] 
also to the case of general two-player zero-sum differential games with nonlinear 
dynamics and pay-off functional and with possible control and/or final-state con-
straints. It was assumed that the minimizing player has the opportunity to choose the 
values of certain parameters before the game starts. The question was, what values 
of these parameters should he choose to further increase his own gain (decrease his 
pay-off functional) at the maximizing player's expense? In turn, the maximizing 
player had to solve the "worst-case" analysis problem, i.e., to determine the greatest 
lower bound for his expected pay-off. Otherwise speaking, saddle-point of the game 
in question was function of certain parameters and the minimizing player could choose 
the most favourable saddle-point due to his aims. 
For the case of linear quadratic differential games this two-player zero-sum problem 
was studied by Leondes and Siu [13]. They suggested several numerical methods for 
iterative parameter optimization. However, their approach was limited only to 
system parameters (elements of the transition matrix). Moreover, in the linear quadra-
tic differential game it was possible to use the a priori knowledge of the optimal 
strategies for both players. 
The aim of the present contribution is to show that a similar approach is possible 
in many-players nonzero-sum differential games. It is assumed that one of the parti-
cipating players, e.g. the first, has the above mentioned opportunity of choosing the 
values of certain parameters before the game starts. His aim is clearly to further 
decreases his pay-off functional with respect to its value in Nash equilibrium. At this 
place it is also assumed that the Nash equilibrium is the only attractive solution for 
a game in question, i.e., no coalitions, bargaining, threats, etc. are allowed. Anyhow, 
one must be aware of one rather important exception with respect to the two-player 
zero-sum case. Namely it is a priori not clear in which directions the changes of pay-
off functionals of the remaining players will occur. Evidently, these changes depend 
on a particular form of each pay-off functional or more exactly, on the fact to what 
extent aims of the respective player coincide with those of the first player. 
In our approach both optimal equilibrium strategies (open-loop) and optimal values 
of parameters are determined during the course of calculations. The developed 
first-order gradient algorithm can also handle problems with control and parameter 
constraints, and final-state constraints. This algorithm, not including parameter 
optimization, was used earlier in [14, 15] to obtain a numerical solution of zero-sum 
and nonzero-sum differential games. 
In the following sections first the formulation of the problem is presented and 
necessary optimality conditions are discussed. Then the gradient algorithm mentioned 
above is described in detail. To simplify the notation only two-player nonzero-sum 
case is treated explicitely. Finally, the solution of concrete differential games with 
parameters is included which confirms the practical importance of the suggested 
algorithm. 
2. PROBLEM FORMULATION 
In this section a precise formulation of the studied problem is given. It is assumed 
that all vectors are the column vectors except of gradients of various functions, which 
are always treated as row-vectors. All further defined functions are supposed to be 
continuously differentiable. As E" will be denoted the n-dimensional Euclidean space. 
For the sake of simplicity only the problems with fixed final time will be studied, 
i.e., without any loss of generality we may assume that the independent variable 
(time) t s [0, 1]. The generalization of the next results to the case of free final time 
can be principally done according to the scheme indicated in [16, 17]. 
For the sake of notational simplicity let us consider explicitely only two-player 
nonzero-sum differential games. Clearly such restriction is a formal one with no loss 
of generality and second player represents all remaining participants. Let 
(1) x = f(x, u, v, a, t), x(0) = x0 , t e [0,1] , 
where x(t) e E" denotes the state and u(t) e Em and v(t) e E9, the control variables of 
participating players at the time t, a e Er the parameter and j : E" x Em x Eq x 
x Er x E1 -> E". The aim of the first player (denoted I) is to choose a strategy u(t) 
and a parameter a to minimize the cost functional (pay-off) 
(2) Ji(w, v, a) = [V(x, a)] , + Ll(x, u, v, a, t) df, 
while the aim of the second player (denoted II) is to minimize 
(3) J2(u, v, a) = [(p
2(x, a ) ] . + L2(x, u, v, a, t) At 
using a strategy v(t). Here q>' : E" x Er -> E- and L : E" x E" x Eq x Er x E1 -* 
-» E1, i = 1,2. The lower indices 0 and 1 denote the evaluation of the corresponding 
expressions at t = 0 and t = 1. 
Finally, the choices of both players must satisfy the control and parameter con-
straints 
(4) u(t) e U c Era , "(t) e V c E«, f 6 [0,1] , 
0 G A C Er 
and the terminal (final-state) constraints 
(5) WvO],=0, 
where \j/ : E" x Er -* Es. 
Let o e A. We shall say that the strategy pair (u, v) is admissible if it satisfies the 
control constraints in (4) and the resulting trajectory according to (1) satisfies (5). 
As the solution of differential game ( l ) - (5) let us consider the well-known Nash 
equilibrium, i.e., such admissible strategy pair («*, v*) for which a e A, and 
(6) J*(a) = Jt(u*, v*, a) ^ J^u, v*, a) , 
J*(a) = J2(u*, v*, a) ^ J2(u*, v, a), 
with (u, v*) and (u*, v) being any admissible strategy pairs. Usually one takes u(t) 
and v(t) as piecewise continuous functions of t. 
Values J*(a) and J*(a) denote the equilibrium outcomes for respective players 
depending, however, on a particular choice of a e A by Player I. Assume the existence 
of the Nash equilibrium for each a e A. Player I then clearly chooses a* such that 
(if it exists) 
(7) J* = J*(a*) = Jy(u*, v*, a*) ^ Jx{u*, v*,a), aeA, 
i.e., a* — arg min {J*(a) | a e A}. On the other hand, no such condition can be 
written for J%(a*) as discussed above. 
As a* is principally known to both players when the game starts, the solution of 
this parametrized differential game is given by (7) provided that both players act 
according to (6). 
3. NECESSARY OPTIMALITY CONDITIONS 
It is obvious and well-known that to find an optimal parameter a*, the augmented-
state approach can be applied. Namely, the r elements of a are considered as addition-
al state variables. For a moment let us neglect the constraints (4). 
Applying now the calculus of variations it is not very difficult to show that if u*(t), 
v*(t), a* form an optimal solution of the differential game with parameters given 
by ( l ) - (3 ) , and (5), then there exist Xt(t), X2(t) e E", te [0, 1], and v e £
s such that 
(symbol T denotes transposition and subscripts stand for the corresponding partial 
derivates) 
(8) X, = -fTXt - (L\Y , te [ 0 , 1 ] , 
A 2 = ~f
T
xX2~(L\y, .-e [ 0 , 1 ] , 
(9) [ A t - ( * i )
T - - * r v ] . - - 0 , 
[ A a - K r - ^ v j t - O , 
(10) fuX, + (L\f = 0 , 16 [0,1] , 
(11) /„rA2 + (£
2„)r = 0, . e [ 0 , l ] , 
(12) J V A . + (L\T\ &t + {{cpiy + tfv]. = 0 . 
In these relations all functions are to be evaluated along the optimal solution. 
Equations (8) and (9) together with (5) define the unknown multipliers X1(t),X2(t) 
and v, while (10) and (11) give the so-called equilibrium conditions. Finally, equation 
(12) determines the optimal parameter a*. Combining (1) and (5) with (8)-(12) one 
can easily see that, in principle, a nonlinear two-point boundary-value problem for 
the system of 2>n differential equations has to be solved. In JV-player case one has 
clearly (N + 1) n differential equations. However, such problems cannot be generally 
solved in analytical way and thus iterative numerical methods must be applied. 
If the constraints (4) are present, then equations (10) —(12) have the following 
form 
(13) Hx(x*, «*, v*, A., a, t) ^ min Hr(x*, u, v*, Xu a, t) , 
U£U 
H2(x*, u*, v*, X2, a, t) ^ min H2(x*, u*, v, X2, a, t), 
veV 
where x* corresponds to (u*, v*), t e [0, 1], a e A, and where 
(14) H{x, u, v, Xh a, t) = 
= L(x, u, v, a, t) + Xjf(x, u, v,a,t), te [0, l ] , i = 1, 2 , 
and 
(15) | f [/JA. + (L\r\ dt + [(cplY + fa]!* Sa = 0, 
where 5a is any feasible parameter change, i.e., a* + 5a e A. For further details in 
this respect see Ahmed and Georganas [3]. 
4. PROBLEM OF TERMINAL CONSTRAINTS 
When formulating optimality conditions (8) —(12), the terminal constraints (5) 
were taken into the account by a single multiplier v e Es, being therefore common 
for all (in our case two) players. This fact is by far not so obvious, namely, in several 
pioneering works dealing with a many-player case subject to terminal constraints 
(5) the stated necessary optimality conditions contained the number of multipliers v 
equal to that of participating players, e.g., see the paper of Sarma et all [18]. 
Tendency to "equip" each player with his own multiplier can be to a certain extent 
explained by the histoirical background going to the calculus of variations and opti-
mal control theory. In fact, the well-known saddle-point solution of two-player 
zero-sum differential games is nothing else then "two-sided" maximum principle as 
explained by Berkovitz [19], and analogously also Nash equilibrium in the many-
player case as given by Case [20]. Such interpretation of a solution differential 
games leads naturally also to the consideration of two-sided, resp. many-sided, 
optimal control problems instead of the original differential games. 
Influenced by such a reasoning one "introduces" various multipliers not only with 
respect to the particular aims of a respective player (multipliers Aj), but also with 
respect to the common terminal constraints (multipliers vf). However, such approach 
does not take into the account the "parallel" character of players' action during the 
course a game. Only in the case when one of the players has to play against the known 
strategies of remaining players the various v; can be allowed. This is then a basis for 
various gradient-type algorithms developed for iterative solution of differential 
game problems. An algorithm of this type is described in the next section including 
also parameter optimization for the first player. This discussion and explanation 
pertains also to the previous author's works [11, 12, 14—17] dealing with numerical 
solution of differential games. It is not difficult to show that in zero-sum case the 
multipliers vz and vn differ only in sign — see [14] for necessary details. In the nonzero-
sum case the situation is not so obvious - see [15]. 
In principle, it is also possible to formulate a gradient-type algorithm having a com-
mon multiplier v for all players. Formally one only needs to "add" the pertinent 
changes in terminal constraints, see (27) —(28) stated further, assuming a sole mul-
tiplier v. Because the computed multipliers v; for each player are not usually the same 
[12, 14, 15], one has to expect certain changes in solution when taking only one v 
into the account. This circumstance was also confirmed by numerical calculations 
and the comparison will be published elsewhere. 
On the other hand, terminal constraints (5) pertain to the differential game as 
a whole and must be therefore adjoint by a sole multiplier v. Only in this case also 
the resulting two-point boundary-value problem is meaningful, i.e., the unknown 
multiplier v can be computed, at least in principle, invoking the constraints (5). 
Otherwise such additional unjustified multipliers will result in redundant constants 
which cannot be excluded or determined, and the use of indirect numerical methods, 
such as quasilinearization, would be prevented. 
It is also worth mentioning at this place that numerical results obtained by quasi-
linearization and gradient algorithm (with sole multiplier v) are in a fairly good 
agreement and may be the use of only one multiplier v in gradient-type algorithms 
for the numerical solution of differential games will be more appropriate in the future. 
Let us illustrate these ideas by a simple example of two-player differential game 
originally studied in [21]. Its various modifications were considered also by the author 
in the above mentioned references. Clearly the parameter optimization is unimportant 
from this point of view and is therefore omitted for a moment. For the sake of com-
parison consider also examples of differential games solved in [14] and [15]. For the 
remaining of this section all variables let be scalar quantities. 
Consider (1) having the form 
(16) x, = x2 , x,(0) = 1 , 
x2 = - x , + u + v + (1 - x
2) x2 , x2(0) = 0 , 
and the pay-off functionals (2) and (3) given as 
(17) J, = - J2 = | (x\ + x\ + 0-25w
2 - v2) it, 
in the zero-sum case, and as 
(18) J , = \(x\ + x\ + 0-5«2)df, 
j 2 = \x\ + x | ] , + 0-5 v
2át, 
in the nonzero-sum case. In both cases let the terminal constraint 
(19) [x, - x2 - 1-5], = 0 
be present. No control constraints of type (4) are assumed. 
Applying the results of [14, 15] or directly (8) —(11) it is possible to show the final 
conditions of the type (9) have the form (A has clearly two components) 
(20) [A, - v ] , = 0 , [A2 + v], = 0 , 
in the zero-sum, and 
(21) p i _ v ] , = 0 , p 2 + v] , = 0, 
[ A 2 - 2 x , - v ] , = 0 , p
2 - 2 x 2 + v] t = 0 , 
in the nonzero-sum case. Eliminating v one obtains the missing terminal condition 
with former case, resp. three missing conditions in the latter case. Finally, on sub-
stituting for u and v according (9) into the corresponding equations (8) and (16) 
the desired two-point boundary-value problems 
(22) *. = x2 , x.(0) = 1 , 
*2 = " * i + ( l - x 2 ) x 2 - l - 5 A 1 , x 2 (0)= 0 , 
A. = (1 + 2xxx2) A2 - 2x, , A,(l) = -A2( l ) , 
X2 = -A , - (1 - x
2) A2 - 2x2 , x,(l) - x2(l) = 1-5 , 
and 
(23) x, = x 2 , x , (0 )= 1, 
x2 = - x . + (1 - x
2) x2 - X\ - l\ , x2(0) = 0 , 
X\ = (1 + 2xxx2) A
2 - 2x, , A}(1) = - A 2 ( l ) , 
X\ = _ A; - (1 - x
2) A2 - 2x2 , 2(x,(l) + x2(l)) = Ai(l) + A
2(l), 
X\ = (1 + 2x1x2) A
2 , 2x,(l) =- A}(1) + A2(l), 
X\ = -A 2 - ( 1 - x ? ) A
2 , x , ( l ) - x 2 ( l ) = 1-5, 
are obtained in the zero-sum and nonzero-sum cases, respectively. 
Both problems can be solved applying the quasilinearization method [22]. 
Satisfactory solution (quadratic change in two consecutive iterations less than 10~20) 
was achieved in 5, resp. in 4 iterations. The obtained solutions are identical with those 
determined by a gradient algorithm, however, using a sole multiplier v. Analogical 
discussion pertains also to the case with parameters — see Examples 2 and 4 presented 
further and [23]. 
5. FIRST-ORDER GRADIENT ALGORITHM 
The numerical approach to the studied problem is based on the first-order gradient 
algorithm originally described by Bryson and Ho [8] for optimal control problems. 
Its applicability to zero-sum and nonzero-sum differential games was demonstrated 
by the author [11, 12, 14-17] . Let us only point out the fact that control and para-
meter constraints (4) are treated applying the idea of a projection [9]. 
The derivation of the algorithm is omitted, because it can be done rather easily 
having in mind the just mentioned references, e.g., see [14, 15]. Recall the fact 
mentioned in the last section, that a "two-sided" optimization problem will be solved, 
i e., two distinct parameters Vj and vn will be used. The resulting algorithm then 
consists of the following steps. 
62 STEP 1. Select the feasible initial solution estimate, i.e., strategies u(t), v(t), t e [0, 1], 
and the value of parameter a not violating the constraints (4). 
STEP 2. Integrate the system (1) in the sense of the increasing time (forward run) 
using the given initial condition, on applying the values estimated in Step 1. Record 
the histories x(t), u(t) and v(t), te [0, 1], and the values [<j»i]i, [<p2]i, [<?>!,] i> M i , 
W i and [ I A J J . 
STEP 3. Integrate in the sense of the decreasing time (backward run) to obtain 
n-dimensional influence functions pt(t), i = 1,2, and (n x s)-dimensional influence 
function R(t), t e [0, 1] according to formulas 
(24) pt = -fxPi - (Iixf , Pi(l) = [ < | [ , i = 1,2, 
(25) R = - L T R , R(l) = M r ] t . 
STEP 4. Compute the following expressions (dimensions are obvious from the 
preceding considerations) 
(26) fu = J R
TfuWjf,R dt, 
C = [lRTLW„fjR dt, 




I'A = J W - + L2V) WjjtfR dt, 
ha = W j + (Vkd*, 
ha =[<Pa]l+^(pTJa + Lla)dt. 
Here Ws(t) and Wu(t), t e [0 ,1] , are positive definite matrix functions having the 
dimensions (m x m) and (q x q), respectively. 
STEP 5. Select 
(27) Sfr = - e . M i , 0 ^ £ / ^ 1 , 
fyn = ~%Wi , 0 = SJJ ^ 1 , 
to achieve better satisfaction of (5). Then compute s-vectors 
(28) v, = -A-^(d^j + A%), 
v1I=-(l"*r
i(Zhr + (lI4)T), 
where 
V^"J A^ = ^ifiiji + * i/ia^a'tya > 
A* = iU + //.wyj., 
with Wa being a positive definite (r x r)-matrix. It is assumed that all indicated 
inversions exist. 
STEP 6. The existing solution estimates u(t), v(t), and a are updated by adding the 
corrections 
(30) 5u = - Wt\pu + (Pl + RvjffJ , t e [0, 1] , 
Sv - - jy„[z» + (p2 + Rv//)
r/Jr , t 6 [0, 1] , 
da= -Wa[lJa + v
TI,aY. 
STEP 7. Check, if the resulting new solution estimates 
(31) u(t) = u(t) + du(t) , te[0, 1 ] , 
v(t) = v(t) + 5v(t), t e [0, 1] , 
a = a + 8a , 
satisfy the constraints (4). If this is not the case, perform projection according to 
formulas 
(32) u(t) = proj [u(t) | V] , t e [ 0 , 1 ] , 
v(t) = proj [-{*) | V\ , te[0,l], 
a = proj [a | A] , 
wheje y0 e E" and Q c £" we define 
(33) proj [y0 | Q] = arg min {|y - y0|| | y e Q) , 
i.e., under the projection of the point y0 we understand its nearest point y e Q. 
STEP 8. Using the projected values compute the corresponding feasible changes 
^u(^), §v(t), t G [0, 1], and da, and evaluate the relations 
(34) / . = daTWa~




If St < e, i — 1, 2, and |[^]«| < <5 (e, 5 are the permitted errors in optimality con-
ditions and terminal constraints violation, respectively), then stop the computations; 
else go to Step 2. 
64 The weighting matrices can be roughly determined using the comparison with the 
so-called predicted values, e.g., see [8], [14, 17]. Anyhow, it is usually sufficient to 
adjust these values only at the beginning of computations performing several trail 
runs of the algorithm. As in optimal control theory it will be always necessary to try 
various initial solution estimates in order to avoid the possibility of obtaining only 
a local optimum. The stopping condition (34) can be alternatively derived from the 
resulting changes of the pay-off functionals Ju J2 in two successive iterations. 
It is also evident that the required projection (32) can cause certain difficulties, 
because we are not always able to compute it in analytical way. However, in a number 
of practically important cases, where the constraining sets are given as parallelepipeds, 
spheres, balls, etc, the desired projection is easily determined. Thus this approach 
represents an interesting numerical tool for the studied parameter optimization 
problem. 
6. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES 
To illustrate the practical importance of the developed algorithm let us solve in 
this section several illustrative examples. All examples were solved using the SIMFOR 
simulation program of Cerny [24] in the connection with EAI PACER 600 computer 
(digital part). This interactive simulation program for the solution of two-point 
boundary-value problems simplifies the realization of many numerical methods for 
dynamic optimization. Such an approach saves a lot of routine programmer's work 
and enables a direct use of the whole EAI PACER 600 computer system installed 
at the Institute of Information Theory and Automation. 
In this section all variables are scalars. The obvious transformation, if necessary, 
to the normalized time interval is not explicitely mentioned in the sequel. However, 
all indications concerning the number of iterations for convergence, weighting 
constants, etc., pertain to this normalized form. As stopping conditions the values 
e = 10"1 0 and d = 10"6 , if necessary, are used. As above, a parameter a is used by 
Player I (control u), to decrease his pay-off in the studied differential game. Let us 
also note that the all figures are the direct prints of computer display using the Hard 
Copy Unit. All integrations were done using the 3rd order variable step Runga-
Kutta method with overall permitted error emax = 10"
4 . Definite integrals were 
evaluated using Simpson's rule. 
Example 1. Consider a modification of the problem studied in the previous section 
with first component of the initial state as a parameter. First, to make comparison 
possible, the zero-sum case is investigated, which originally appeared in [12]. The 
system equations are then as follows 
(35) *. = x2, x,(0) = a, 
X2 = — X, + U — V + (1 — Xi) x2 , x 2 (0) = 1 . 
The pay-off functional 
(36) J, = ~J2 = i [x
2 ] t . S + \ f ' V 5 "
2 - 2-0,2)d/, 
2 2 Jo 
and constraint 
(37) |и(ř)| ѓ 0-8, í є [ 0 , 1 ] 
To obtain the problem with fixed initial state, as required in (I), let us perform the 
substitution 
(38) y t =Xi - a, 
y2 =
 xz • 
In this way we obtain the following differentia] game with parameter 
(39) yi = y2, }',(o) = o , 
h = - O i + a) + u - v + y2 - (yt + a)
2 y2 , y2(0) = 1 , 
(40) /. - ~J2 =Һ{Уí + fl)
2],.5 + ; Ґ V
5 " 2 - 2 - 0 , ; 2 ) d ř 2 2 J 0 
The nominal solution estimates were u(t) = y(f) = 0, t e [0, l ] and a = 0. The 







Fig. 1. Optimal solution of Example 1. 
= W}j = 0-5 and Wa = 1-0. The obtained optimal values are a* = 1-0465 and J* = 
= — /* = 0-25453. Time-histories of all variables are shown in Fig. 1. This problem 
without the constraint (37) was solved in [11] with a* = 1-0285 and J* = —/* = 
= 0-24941, i.e., as it was possible to expect the constraint (37) results in a less 
X1 
\ x 2 
t 
V J < > ! — 
u 
-
66 favourable situation for the minimizing player. Also in this example the choice of 
initial solution estimates is not crucial and the convergence is easily achieved for other 
initial estimates. 
Example 2. Consider again the system (35) with the pay-off functional 
1 r1-5 
(41) J1= -J2=-\ (x\ + x
2
2 + 0-5«
2 - 2-0u2) At 
2 J o 
and the terminal (final-state) constraint 
(42) [ x i - x 2 - 2 ] 1 . 5 « 0 , 






J i = - J2 = - [(>>! + a)
2 + y\ + 0-5M2 - 2-0u2] dř 
2 J o 
ÍУi + a- y2- 2 ] ь 5 - °-
With the same initial estimate as in Example 1 and with weighting constants W1 = 
= Wn = Wa = 0-5, and sx = sI{ = 0-7, the desired accuracy was reached in 22 
iterations with the optimal values a* = 0-65536 and J* = -J* = 1-2226. The cor-
Fig. 2. Optimal solution of Example 2. 
responding final state was x1 = 0-62089 and x2 = -1-3791, and terminal multipliers 
vj = -0-93768 and vn = 0-68596. The optimal solution is depicted in Fig. 2. If the 
terminal constraint (42) are not present, the algorithm converges to a* = 0-15323 
and J* = —J* = 0-73674, i.e., the satisfaction of (42) is rather convenient for 
Player II. 
As also recently observed in [12], in this example the optimal solution can slightly 67 
vary with the concrete numerical procedure. For example, changing only Wa = 0-3, 
the obtained optimal values are a* = 0-65971 and J* = - J * = 1-2195. This cir­
cumstance can be roughly explained by the rather flat optimum and the existing 
"equilibrium" in satisfaction the optimality conditions and terminal constraint in 
the studied case. The necessary optimality conditions (10) —(12) cannot distinguish 
the exact optimum within the given accuracy in this constrained case. This explana­
tion is further supported by the fact that the optimal value of pay-off functionals 
J*, J* was generally reached in less then one half of the iterations needed for con­
vergence. Maybe the use of more sophisticated numerical methods (quasilinearization, 
conjugate gradients) can clear up this matter. 
Example 3. Also now let the system (35) be given, however, let us study the non­
zero-sum case, where 
(45) Ji = \ (x\ + x\ + u2) dř, 
J 2 = \x\ + x\\ + \ v
2 át. 
The obvious transformation analogical to (40) is not indicated here. Using same 
initial estimates as before the optimal solution was reached in 17 iterations having 
Wj = Wu = 0-5 and Wa = 0-12. It is shown in Fig. 3. Optimal parameter a* = 
Fig. 3. Optimal solution of Example 3. 
= 0-61448, while J* = 1-9428 and J* = 2-2111. When solving this game with fixed 
initial parameter estimate a = 0, then, applying the algorithm of [15], the values 
J? = 3-1699 and J 2 = 5-6285 are obtained. Thus the pay-off functionals of both 
players decrease considerably as the result of optimal parameter selection performed 
by Player I. Other choice of (45) can result, on the other hand, in the increased 
pay-off functional J*. 
Example 4. In addition to the formulation of Example 3 let us assume the terminal 
constraint of the form (42), i.e., 
(46) [x. -x2- 1], = 0 . 
With the same initial estimate as in the preceding examples and with Wt = Wn = 
= 0-4, Wa = 0-12 and et = en = 0-7, the prescribed accuracy was reached in 18 
iterations with the optimal values a* = 0-23080, and J* = 0-88603 and J* = 1-2194. 
Fig. 4. Optimal solution of Example 4. 
For the optimal solution see Fig. 4. The corresponding final state was x. = 0-70191 
and x2 = -0-29809, and terminal multipliers vr = -015796, vn = -2-6171. In 
comparison with Example 3, i.e. the case without the terminal constraint (46), one 
can conclude that the satisfaction of constraints is more convenient for Player I. 
Similar discussion as to the zero-sum case (Examples 1 and 2) pertains also to the 
studied nonzero-sum case (Examples 3 and 4). 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
For a general class of two-player nonzero-sum games, where the first player has 
the additional choice of certain parameters, the necessary optimality conditions 
were briefly derived using the calculus of variations. Based on these conditions a pre-
viously published gradient algorithm [14 — 17] was extended to handle also the 
problems of this type. In this way it was possible to treat nonlinear differential games 
with parameters numerically to obtain both, equilibrium strategies and parameters. 
Moreover, the formulation considered enables to treat in a simple way various 
constraints on controls and parameters (included using a projection technique) and 
on final state (included using multipliers). 
A question of a number of terminal multipliers was discussed in detail. It shows 
that terminal constraints are included by a sole multiplier, which is common for all 
players. On the other hand, in certain situation it is possible to have distinct terminal 
multipliers for each player, e.g. when solving a sequence of successive optimal control 
problems to determine a numerical solution of a particular game — see the described 
gradient algorithm. 
Practical experience with the suggested algorithm was reported and illustrative 
examples of zero-sum and nonzero-sum games were solved in detail. The obtained 
results confirm the applicability of the developed algorithm to the numerical solution 
of practical problems. 
(Received June 27, 1979.) 
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